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Perceptual and recursion-based faculties have long been recognized to be vital constituents of human (and, in general, animal) cognition.  However, certain faculties such as the visual and the linguistic faculty have come to receive far more academic and experimental attention, in recent decades, than other recognized categories of faculties.  This paper seeks to highlight the imbalance in these studies and bring into sharper focus the need for further in-depth philosophical treatments of faculties such as especially hearing, touch, and proprioception, besides other faculties such as the olfactory and gustatory ones.  It also seeks to bring to bear the debate on the role of qualia in perception and overall in cognition in its thesis of the significance of these other modular faculties for genuine insights into cognition as a (now) technologically expanded domain.






Cognitive science has for some time been an established conglomeration of disciplinary approaches that seek to gain deeper insight into the human mind (Bechtel and Graham 1999).  Interestingly, it seems to have survived as such, albeit in continually evolving ways, since doubts about the enterprise were expressed by many contributors to Johnson and Erneling’s (2000) edited volume (e.g., by Jerome Bruner:  Bruner 2000; cf. also different computational perspectives on cognition presented in Lycan 1999).  However, it is also true that the field is no longer quite sure of finding ready solutions to certain key questions that were believed to be within sight of answers under the largely A(rtificial)-I(ntelligence)-driven view of cognitive science that dominated research in the field through the 1960s and 1970s and well into the 1980s.  This is despite the fact that there have been, and continue to be, major innovations in technology both to probe the workings of the human central nervous system and to analyze and model aspects of key human faculties.
	This paper will focus on the issue of whether language suffices to provide us with a genuinely revealing insight into the human mind – analogously to the claim made by the linguistic philosopher Bhatṛhari (c. 5th-7th centuries C.E.) that (spoken) language illuminates everything in the external world – or whether it is merely one of several different “modular” faculties such as the (non-linguistic) visual, the (non-linguistic) auditory, the tactile, the proprioceptive (i.e., pertaining to control over one’s bodily awareness and movements), and the gustatory and olfactory (taken together).​[1]​  Apart from generalized philosophical work on perception (notably Merleau-Ponty 1962) and its relationship with consciousness (Chalmers 1996), research has thus far focused largely on language and the (non-linguistic) visual faculty, with the spotlight being shone on hearing (including its non-linguistic dimensions) only relatively recently (Nudds and O’Callaghan 2010), and even less has there been an attempt to trace the relation between the gustatory and the olfactory, on the one hand, and the cognitive, on the other (as opposed to – exclusively – the classically recognized emotional domain/s of the brain).  This paper aims to make a beginning towards addressing this significant lacuna in research at a conceptual (rather than an overwhelmingly empirical) level.
	Section 2 of the paper lays out the current state of theorizing about the human faculties.  Theorizing about vision that has occurred in recent years will be focused on, beginning with the pioneering work on visual cognition represented by Marr (1982) and going on to more specific treatments such as Kosslyn et al. (1990) and Purves (2005), followed by the more recent comprehensive treatment of visual perception and cognition in Hatfield (2009).  The faculty of hearing is also taken up for consideration in this section.
	Section 3, while apparently very different in tenor from the other sections of this paper, in that it provides a very brief introduction to the conceptions of indriya, ‘perceptual organ / faculty’ in the Puranic tradition, seeks to highlight the philosophical concern shared by this tradition with Western and/or contemporary thought and treatments of issues of perception and cognition.
Section 4 attempts to zoom in further on the notion of a human “faculty”.  The best-known contemporary conceptualization of language as a uniquely human “faculty”, namely, Noam Chomsky’s thesis of Universal Grammar, is focused on in this section.
	In Section 5, the case for proprioception as a “faculty” is taken up for justification.  Despite the fact that it does not seem to have any singularly associated perceptual organ with it (such as eyes for vision, ears for hearing, the nose for smell, or the skin for touch), it is nonetheless like language, in that (a) it is biologically determined and (b) its failure leads to major impairment in functioning as a living being, even if this failure is not immediately life-threatening​[2]​.
	Section 6 tries to grapple with the issue of how modular the faculties under consideration really are, in light of the properties of informational encapsulation and domain-specificity that Fodor (1983) has proposed as typical properties of modules in the realm of cognition as well.
	Section 7, the concluding section, sums up the main argument of this paper in regard to cognition, modular faculties, and modes of perception.


2.	Vision and language … and other “animal” faculties?

To understand the details of various faculties possessed by sentient beings (humans and other animals), one needs to take stock of the current state of research on theorizing about the known faculties – human faculties in particular, largely because these are much more directly accessible to us from our lived experiences as human beings than faculties possessed by other animals are to us).
	One might want to begin with the story of vision as a perceptual faculty thus far.  This is, of course, a faculty that has figured in texts in a variety of traditions since ancient times:  In Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex, the deprivation of vision is the most severe kind of punishment that the eponymous character of the play chooses to inflict on himself, for his own extreme moral failure under the spell of a curse;  and the very approximate Sanskrit equivalent to Greek philosophia was (and is) darśana, literally ‘(act/process of) seeing, glimpse (of divinity or sacredness)’.  The historical and cultural implications of the occurrence of a vision are abundantly there for us to witness in the form of the evidence both since ancient times and in contemporary terms.  That apart, the cognitive organization of vision continues to intrigue both medical researchers into this faculty and philosophers of perception such as (earlier, the late) David Marr (Marr 1982, which is also cited by Noam Chomsky in the context of his work on language) and Gary Hatfield (Hatfield 2009).
	Language is no longer equated with speech alone.  Written language, despite being widely viewed as being derived from speech (see, e.g., de Francis 1989)​[3]​, has come to be a distinct mode of language, so to speak, as also have sign languages for the deaf and for the deaf-blind worldwide.  It follows, therefore, that language is not supervenient on hearing:  the auditory faculty is not a necessary prerequisite for language, or even, as it turns out, universally for speech, as there are deaf users of spoken language who are accomplished lip-readers and who are to be occasionally encountered in different corners of the world.  Further, language is recursion-based:  linguistic expressions have the potential of being recursively embedded, adjoined, or conjoined with one another in systematic ways, often subject to well-defined constraints.  This property of recursiveness that language possesses is, furthermore, to be found in every natural language of the world known thus far (whether spoken, written, or even signed).


	2.1  The faculty of hearing:  A philosophically neglected area?

	Given that so much of our everyday activity – including the use of communications technology since the past century or so – is based on our ability to hear, and given that under certain circumstances even our survival is dependent on hearing, there has been relatively little by way of focused activity in the philosophy of hearing up until very recently in the West in particular (see Crane 2005 on illusions in perception, Deutsch 2009 on musical illusions​[4]​, and especially Nudds & O’Callaghan 2010).  Of course, auditory neurology and auditory phonetics are lively areas of research that have been growing with advances in electronic and magnetic imaging technology;  however, these are areas that are only tangentially treated in the area of cognitive philosophy even today.  Instead, the focus has thus far been on the content of perception in more generalized terms and with problems posed by illusion and hallucination to straightforwardly realist positions on perception (Crane 2005, Nudds 2009).


2.2  A special case in the domain of  hearing:  “tinnitus” versus “anāhata-nāda”

A problematic case in the research program towards arriving at hearing “universals” is that of what Western medicine dubs “tinnitus”, viz., the hearing of sounds internal to one’s body, such as what has been repeatedly described as “ringing in the ears”, a pulse in the head, clicking or “whooshing” sounds within the ear, or simply a “buzz” or hum that becomes particularly prominent perceptually when one closes one’s ears with one’s hands or with relatively hard ear-plugs.  In whatever literature is available on Indian classical music (in both Sanskrit and later Indian languages), at least some of these internal sounds​[5]​ are treated as a special class of sounds, anāhata-nāda ‘musical sound that is not generated through impact’ (as compared to āhata-nāda ‘sound that is generated through impact or an act of striking’).  These are not treated as pathological in any way in the Indian musical tradition;  on the contrary, they are treated as being audible in all their clarity only to specially-endowed sages or to people who have practised meditation (including meditative musical techniques) over a considerable period of time (Kalpana Bhattacharya, personal communication;  cf. also Bandyopadhyay 1973).


3.	A different view of faculties:  The Puranic tradition of ancient India

One’s understanding of the issue of perceptual organs and faculties possessed by sentient beings acquires a different focus when one considers the portrayal of these organs and faculties in a rather different tradition from the present-day context of cognitive science (which arguably possessed a rich and complex history, but one that has been firmly rooted in predominantly Western traditions up until very recently).  The common term for organs of perception in Sanskrit is indriya (also implicated in indriya-sāpekṣa arvāčīna, literally ‘sense-organ-dependent immediate perception’:  Garg 1992: 651), which in the morphology of Vedic Sanskrit is derived from the name of the divinity Indra, who is portrayed in the Ṛg-Veda as “steadying” heaven and earth and the waters:  he is said to be present as an organic force both taking the shape of five (or twelve) different “senses” and giving shape to the different space-time configurations and their cognition as portrayed in the different later-Vedic texts that go by the collective name of the Purāṇas.​[6]​  It is almost as if, in each Puranic text, a different cognitive and perceptual perspective is implicated.  For instance, in the Matsya-Purāṇa, the matsya, ‘fish’, is at the cognitive “centre” of the text, so to speak;  in today’s technology, vision through a “fish-eye lens” does indeed appear rather different from our own human vision, and likewise the piscine sense of time, the diurnal rhythm, and the life-cycle are imagined as rather different, in this alternative cosmology, from the human senses thereof.
	Of course, little can be understood in more concrete terms as regards the actual experiences of other faculties such as the olfactory and gustatory faculties as possessed by animal incarnations of beings, except very indirectly, through anecdotes in these various Puranic traditions.  However, a closer reading of the Purāṇas from a contemporary vantage point suggests something much more radical than our contemporary perspective permits:  namely, a challenge posed to the distinction “human” versus “animal” itself as far as cognition and the faculties are concerned.  For different modes of perception are present to at least as great an extent in so-called “lower” animals as in human beings.  This happens to be borne out by contemporary knowledge regarding human and animal biology as well:  there are clear cases of absence of particular faculties in particular kinds of animals (such as the absence of vision in earthworms and of prototypical hearing in snakes​[7]​, or extreme weakness of the visual faculty in the endangered platanista gangetica, Indo-Gangetic dolphin), but these faculties are well-defined and clearly demarcated off from one another.  Moreover, there is (admittedly) suggestive evidence (thus far) that many animals may possess yet another perceptual mode that is at best very faintly present (and perhaps not even universally present) among human beings, namely, the capacity to sense subterranean vibrations that precede major natural disasters such as earthquakes and tidal waves (tsunamis) – an internal “seismograph”, so to speak, of a much greater predictive capacity than we humans possess naturally.


4.	The special case of language as a human faculty

Language as a faculty that is innate to humans, but one that is realized through language acquisition based on language input from one’s surroundings, has been theorized about extensively and intensively by Noam Chomsky (Chomsky 1986, 1995, 2002, 2005).  In doing so, Chomsky has placed the language faculty in the same category, so to speak, as other recognized perceptual faculties such as the visual, auditory, tactile, proprioceptive (i.e., pertaining to the living body’s self-awareness of and control over its various parts), gustatory, and olfactory faculties.  However, language differs from other perceptual faculties in an important respect, namely, in its mapping on to the conceptual-intentional domain of the mind.  While there is somewhat suggestive evidence that some of the other faculties may also have such mappings on to this latter (“meaningful”) domain of the mind, in the case of language the evidence is overwhelmingly more than suggestive, and continues to grow with ongoing research in meaning and cognition (see, e.g., Jackendoff 1983, and also Townsend and Bever 2001).
Very recently, there has been a radical attempt to account for vision and language as human faculties through a common “grammar” faculty (Mukherji 2010).  This attempt posits this common faculty as constitutive of the heart of the so-called “Biolinguistics” program.  For the purpose of the paper at hand, this particular proposal is being set aside for the time being, since its focus is not centrally that of engaging with the issue of what constitutes the scope of the “Biolinguistics” program.  Instead, what is of interest here is how such a unified biologically-grounded faculty compares with other non-linguistic “sense” faculties that are just as biologically grounded.
The debate about the place of meaning-cognition in relation to the faculty of language as a biologically driven faculty that Mukherji (2010) seeks to raise is not new, however.  Millikan (1989/1999) has earlier proposed a branch of the study of meaning in relation to the mind that she has dubbed “Biosemantics”:  the non-stochastic nature of representations of natural phenomena and categories engendered by means of animal signaling systems (such as those of beavers and honey-bees) and human intentional states as expressible through linguistic expressions such as (complement) sentences and verbs such as believe and desire.  Even earlier than Millikan, McCawley (1981) comprehensively details universal semantic categories and characteristics that get encoded in natural-language structures (a program that he carries further, in much more detail and in newer directions than in his earlier work, in the second edition).​[8]​  


5.	Proprioception as a neurobiological “faculty”

Proprioception is a significant factor in any animal’s capacity to try to protect itself, particularly in difficult environmental circumstances.  It is also a significant factor in at least human beings’ capacity to perform volitional actions such as modulating the vocal cords for “tone of voice"​[9]​, typing on the keyboard, climbing on board a bus, or holding a baby with exactly the right grip.  The chief difference between proprioception and other neurobiologically constituted perceptual faculties lies in the fact that, like language, proprioception cannot be associated exclusively with any particular “sense-organ”, at least externally, though it can in a sense be said to be located in the central nervous system, particularly in the sensory nerve network (Sacks 2004).
	Moreover, proprioception is a faculty that one can be conscious of, both when it is present and when impaired.  The issue of consciousness has not figured in the discussion thus far since it has been treated at length in relation to qualia generated by perceptual faculties (see, e.g., Chalmers 1996).  In the case of proprioception, the story is further complicated, however, by the fact that proprioception, by its very nature, is a subjectively experienced faculty that can be only partially communicated objectively.


6.	Informational encapsulation and domain-specificity as properties of modules:
	Fodor (1983) and subsequent work

In his landmark work in cognitive linguistics/psychology, The Modularity of Mind, the philosopher Jerry A. Fodor has laid out a program for the identification of different modules in human cognition that are, in essence, different faculties of human cognition.  Fodor’s main argument for such a program is predicated on the occurrence of two key properties of modules, in general, that are possessed by these faculties, namely:
(i)	 Informational encapsulation, and
(ii)	Domain-specificity.
As regards informational encapsulation, with the qualification that at least some of the faculties that we have introduced have systematic interfaces with one another that allow for the transfer of particular kinds of information to or from one another, by and large the faculties do exhibit the properties of informational encapsulation.  However, the property of domain-specificity is in danger of being rendered vacuous unless it is clear what notion of “domain” one is working with here.
	Both these criteria, in effect, are met with challenges.  I mention two salient kinds of challenges to the two criteria immediately below, in the following two subsections.

	6.1	Qualia and modes of perception

	Both philosophers who have argued against the reality of qualia (such as Daniel Dennett:  Dennett 1988/1990) and in its favour (Chalmers 1996) tend to conceptually lump all qualia together, regardless of what perceptual mode each quale under consideration belongs to.  This is all the more striking a lacuna, given that the actual examples they have cited are of qualia belonging to different perceptual modes: gustatory, tactile (such as the feeling of sandpaper under one’s fingers:  Tye 2007), olfactory, sensorimotor (e.g., the feeling of a sharp mosquito bite, as the one I just receive even as I type), or auditory, besides the obvious visual examples (e.g., of literally seeing the colour red).  However, exceptional cases aside (such as in pathological synaesthesia or synaesthetic perception under the influence of drugs – not to be confused with synaesthetic imagery in literary creations, which are by definition composite), qualia do belong to different perceptual modes.  Moreover, in robotics, perceptual modes have to be implemented through distinct modules of hardware and software (including connectionist networks where appropriate), at least at a basic level, given the state of the art of robotics thus far.  Accordingly, in serious cognitive science there is a need to draw lines between modes of perception as modules “housing” qualia, so to speak.  The problem is, though, that there is a certain kind of phenomenal unity to these different kinds of qualia:  they are all responses to different aspects of our experience of the world (whether outer, as when one smells a rose or sees a sunset, or inner, as when one tastes an acid reflux or hears sounds in one’s middle or inner ear), and can in fact very occasionally be synesthetic (as in the case of flavours – which typically involve both taste and smell – or the touched sensation of a rugged shape that can give a “visual” impression in a seeing individual).


	6.2	Composition of modes of perception:  Key to real objects?

	Thus far, the focus has been on perceptual and cognitive faculties as being mod(ul)es that inform the subject of objects in the external world – whether these are real or (totally or partially) illusory.  In practice, however, we discern objects as having reality in the external world only when it is perceived in multiple perceptual (or cognitive) modes.  Thus, for instance, I may hear a sentence spoken in the next room and immediately want to check to see whether a stranger has entered that room – only to find that it is being spoken onscreen on television (assuming that the sentence just uttered is relatively noise-free and thus ambiguous between a “real voice” and an electronically telecast one).  Alternatively, however, I might check and actually find a real person who spoke that sentence in the next room, whose reality can be (potentially) further checked out through touch – or by engaging in linguistic exchange with him.  Real food is recognized as such (as opposed to any realistic model of the same food) through a combination of vision, taste, and smell, and (perhaps more so in some societies of the world than in others) touch as well.  Thus far, attempts to model virtual reality for computational, pedagogical, and other practical purposes have met with at best partial success simply because these attempts have not yet succeeded in replicating the compositeness of perceived qualia relating to real – as compared with illusory or hallucinatory – objects.
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^1	  See Fodor (1983) for an early proposal that the human mind accesses several “modules”.
^2	  The qualifying adverb “immediately” is significant here:  both language deficits and the absence of proprioception can potentially lead to ultimately fatal consequences for the impaired individual as s/he tries to negotiate everyday existence.
^3	  Derrida (1976/1998), however, suggests an alternative view of writing as having originated in pictorial representation and thus antedating speech.
^4	  The author would like to thank Anita Mehta of the S. N. Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, India, a physicist and an accomplished musician herself, for drawing my attention to the empirical work of Diane Deutsch on musical and other acoustic illusions.
^5	  Not all of these internal sounds are necessarily non-pathological even in indigenous medical traditions in south Asia, however – typically, such pathological internal sounds are described by special onomatopoeic (often reduplicative) expressions in several languages of south Asia.
^6	  Garg (1992).  The author is grateful to Parthasarathi Banerjee, Director of the National Institute of Science, Technology, and Development Studies, India, for directing me to this rich tradition and for discussion of some of the points in this section.
^7	  However, snakes do have mechanosensation if not prototypical hearing:  they can physically “sense” approaching footsteps of humans and other larger animals, for example.
^8	  James D. McCawley (1938-1999), a mathematician (in his youth) who became an eminent linguist, was one of Chomsky’s earliest doctoral students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and, even though he wrote his doctoral thesis in the branch of linguistics known as phonology (the theoretical and empirical study of how sounds of various kinds and dimensions pattern with one another in natural languages), published extensively in syntax – with semantics as a key basis for syntactic analysis – through the late 1960s into the early 1980s or so, until he (along with other prominent syntacticians of this “generative semantics” approach, such as John Robert Ross and George Lakoff) fell afoul of Chomsky’s discomfort with serious academic criticism of his work.  Goldsmith and Huck (1995) present a different, more sociologically-oriented explanation of this turn of events.
^9	  This was severely impaired in the case of the patient described by Sacks (1987) as the “Disembodied Lady”, for instance.  Sacks’ chapter on this proprioception-deprived patient is reproduced with an additional introductory section on proprioception (as Sacks 2004) in Warburton (2004).
